This paper proposes an implicit control mechanism of managers inside the …rm. We argue that the need to motivate workers may make it bene…cial for a self-interested, short-sighted manager to pursue the long-term viability of a …rm. When the …rm is in a stable environment, this implicit control mechanism may not contradict shareholder value maximization. However, when the …rm needs restructuring, this mechanism diminishes …rm value. We discuss when external governance is desirable, and when it is not. Our model also o¤ers economic explanations for some related issues in managerial behaviour, such as restructuring aversion, survival motive, and excessive risk aversion.
Introduction
In modern corporations, managerial discipline is crucial for good corporate performance. Since Berle and Means (1932) a great deal of e¤ort has been exerted to investigate managerial discipline, and it has been the central issue in corporate governance debates. Especially in the economics literature it has been argued that governance mechanisms by shareholders such as the board of directors, executive stock-based compensation, takeover threats, and monitoring by large shareholders, are necessary to control managers e¤ectively and to ensure e¢ cient operation of …rms (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) .
We appreciate helpful comments and suggestions from Franklin Allen, Tomio Arai, Tadashi Yagi, Noriyuki Yanagawa, an anonymous referee, the Associate Editor (Hideshi Itoh), and seminar participants at Doshisha University, Waseda University, and the European Economic Association Annual Congress 2004. We are especially grateful to Motonari Kurasawa for encouraging us to write this paper.
In empirical studies over the last few decades, however, there seems to have been disappointingly limited evidence supporting the e¤ectiveness of shareholder governance. 1 In addition, we often observe …rms that continue to perform fairly well even if they appear to have very weak governance mechanisms (Allen and Gale, 2000; Vives, 2000) . Natural questions then arise. Is it possible that …rms operate e¢ ciently without governance? If so, how are managers controlled in those …rms? 2 This paper studies the possibility that managers can be controlled internally. We propose a model based on the simple idea that, if a manager needs the cooperation from his workers, he must take into account the e¤ect of his decisions on their future, and this will in turn a¤ect his decisions. We show that when a short-sighted manager needs to motivate workers it may be bene…cial for him to pursue the long-run viability of the …rm while relinquishing his own self-interests. We call this mechanism "implicit control inside the …rm". Under certain conditions managers are controlled internally in such a way that they make decisions that serve the interest of shareholders, even if there is no explicit shareholder governance. We argue that this implicit control mechanism may be substituted for external governance mechanisms.
We also point out that the implicit control mechanism does not always work well. In particular, we show that it damages shareholder wealth when the …rm needs restructuring. Without external pressure the manager is inclined to maintain the status-quo and may avoid restructuring even if the latter would maximize …rm value. In such a case some external governance is necessary to achieve increased …rm value. This is consistent with the empirical evidence that external governance does indeed facilitate restructuring (Denis, Denis and Sarin, 1996; Kang and Shivdasani, 1997; Berger and Ofek, 1999) .
Our model also suggests that the intensity of the implicit control depends upon labour market conditions and other worker-related variables. Since they vary signi…cantly according to country, our model may help to explain international di¤erences in corporate governance. Moreover we are able to o¤er economic explanations for managers'reluctance to conduct restructuring (Baron and Kreps, 1999; Grinblatt and Titman, 2001 ), their survival motive (Radner, 1996) , and their risk aversion (Stulz, 1984; Smith and Stulz, 1985) , which have usually been attributed to management psychology.
The in ‡uence of subordinates on managerial decision making is discussed by Allen and Gale (2000, Ch. 12). They assume that managerial decisions require consensus from all members of the management team who may have di¤erent tenures, and show that the 1 See, e.g., Core, Guay and Larcker (2003) for executive compensation, Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) for board of directors, Holderness (2003) for blockholders. Becht, Bolton and Roell (2002) provide an extensive overview. 2 One answer would be that product market competition disciplines management (Schmidt, 1997) . Our paper o¤ers an alternative explanation.
equilibrium decision sequentially exhibits a longer time horizon than the remaining tenure of each member. Unlike Allen and Gale (2000), we explicitly model the interaction between a decision maker (manager) and his subordinate (worker), which gives rise to in ‡uence on managerial decisions (implicit control). More importantly, our focus is to identify when such worker in ‡uence is desirable and when it is not, from the shareholders'perspective. The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a model of managerial decision making in the absence of shareholder governance. Section 3 discusses several implications of the model. Section 4 concludes.
Model

Setting
Let us consider a …rm that consists of one manager, one worker, and its shareholders. The manager, worker, and shareholders all are assumed to be risk neutral. The model involves two periods. While the manager lives only for the current period, the worker lives for both the current and next periods. 3 The shareholders also live for both periods. The …rm operates in the current period, utilizing the assets in place and the labour force. It yields current revenue a if the worker provides e¤ort (E = e), and 0 if he shirks (E = 0). Before the current period production takes place, the manager chooses among three types of project. These projects are di¤erent both in their e¤ect on the future operation of the …rm and in the private bene…ts the manager enjoys (See Table 1 ). The project choice does not a¤ect the current performance of the …rm. With one of the projects, called Project-A, the …rm continues to operate and the …rm value in the next period is V (> 0).
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From Project-A the manager obtains no private bene…ts. Another project, called Project-B, forces the …rm into bankruptcy at the end of the current period, so that the …rm value in the next period becomes 0. Project-B, however, gives the manager private bene…ts denoted by z. Project-B represents activities that hurt the …rm value but bene…t the manager, such as investment in his "pet"project. The other project is a restructuring plan called Project-R. While Project-R gives the post-restructuring …rm value K(> 0) in the next period, there are no private bene…ts for the manager. In addition, with Project-R, the worker must be replaced at the end of the current period. We do not specify whether V or K is greater. When V > K we can say that the …rm is in a relatively stable environment, where worker Project-A Project-B Project-R Next period …rm value V 0 K Manager's private bene…t 0 z 0 Table 1 : Projects replacement is unnecessary. In contrast, V < K would correspond to situations where the …rm needs restructuring, so as to adjust itself to a large environmental shift. Note that while worker e¤ort determines the current revenue a, the manager's project choice (A, B, or R) a¤ects the future value of the …rm. These assumptions highlight the notion that the manager's decisions have important consequences on the …rm's performance beyond his tenure. 5 The manager's utility is assumed to take the following form:
It consists of three components: managerial compensation, disutility of worker monitoring, and private bene…ts. First, the manager receives a fraction (> 0) of the …rm's current pro…t, which is revenue a minus a constant wage w. Second, he has to elicit worker e¤ort in the current period by monitoring the worker. 6 The intensity of worker monitoring is represented by m, the probability that the manager can detect worker shirking. The non-negative cost parameter represents the di¢ culty inherent in monitoring the worker. We assume that (a w) > m, so that it always is better for the manager to induce worker e¤ort than to let him shirk. Third, Z is the private bene…ts the manager enjoys. If he chooses Project-B, then Z = z > 0. If he implements Project-A or -R, then Z = 0. The manager's utility function (1) implies that he is interested only in the compensation, private costs, and bene…ts realized in the current period. In other words, he has no reputational concerns for his future career. 7 Moreover, the manager's compensation 5 Alternatively, we can let the project choice a¤ect the current revenue, as well as the future …rm value.
This does not change the nature of the implicit control mechanism illustrated in this chapter. 6 We make the assumption that the manager cannot provide worker incentives through a contract on the revenue a. This may seem arbitrary given that a perfectly re ‡ects the worker's e¤ort. However, while for simplicity the …rm is assumed to employ only one worker in our model, we primarily concern large …rms with diverse shareholders, which typically have a number of workers whose individual outputs are very di¢ cult to measure. If the revenue is a function of the e¤orts of many workers, incentive contracts on the revenue should be ine¤ective to induce individual e¤ort because of the free-rider problem. 7 This would be the case where the manager is close to the end of his career. Kaplan (1994) reports that CEO's age is higher in Japan than in the US: the median CEO age for Japanese …rms is 66, whereas that for US …rms is 59. This evidence suggests that reputational concerns of managers are less signi…cant in Japan than in the US.
depends on the current pro…t a w, but not on the manager's project choice itself or on future …rm value. Here, we assume that the current pro…t is contractible between the shareholders and the manager, while project choice and future …rm value are not. The current pro…t would normally be veri…able, and many …rms do adopt earnings-based compensation such as executive bonuses. In contrast, it would hardly be possible to completely verify the manager's decision itself, as it typically involves very complex processes that are not observable to those outside the …rm. On the other hand, it might seem odd to assume that …rm value itself is not contractible because in reality we do observe stock-based compensation such as managerial shareholding or stock options. However, except for in the US and the UK they are not observed so frequently, and in other countries even if adopted they typically account for only a small fraction of total managerial compensation. 8 Since we are interested in why certain …rms perform well even in the absence of shareholder governance we focus on the case where no stock-based compensations are available. Now the nature of the agency problem in our model is clear from the manager's utility function. Since he is concerned only with current pro…ts, not with the company's future, there is no guarantee that this short-sighted manager chooses the project that maximizes the future value of the …rm. In what follows, we will explore how this agency problem can be mitigated internally.
The worker's current period utility is given by his wage minus e¤ort, w E. We assume that the worker is able to observe the manager's project choice and monitoring intensity. This assumption means that the worker is in a better position to observe managerial behaviour than the shareholders via insider information and daily interactions with the manager (Hansmann, 1996 , Ch.5). After observing the manager's project choice and monitoring intensity the worker chooses an e¤ort level that is E = e or E = 0. If he exerts e¤ort (E = e) he receives wage w and stays at the …rm in the next period, as long as the …rm continues to operate and restructuring does not occur. 9 If the worker shirks (E = 0) he will be caught with probability m. If caught shirking he is dismissed immediately without being paid and the worker will not be employed by the same …rm in the next period. The worker's next period utility is given by H if he leaves the …rm during or after the current period. On the other hand, if he continues to work for the same …rm his utility is H + r. In other words, the worker receives rents, denoted by r(> 0), if the …rm operates and the worker stays during the next period. Such rents would be available if there is a joint surplus from the current …rm-worker match and he has bargaining power to extract For example, r can be generated through search and hiring costs (Pissarides, 2000) , or from the incumbent worker's …rm-speci…c skills that make him more productive than a newly hired worker (Hashimoto, 1981) .
In order to focus on the situation where there is no e¤ective shareholder governance, we assume that the shareholders are completely passive. That is, they cannot intervene in the manager's project choice. 10 The shareholders simply receive a fraction of the pro…t
(1 )(a w) as dividends in the current period and obtain the next period …rm value (V , 0, or K). Hence, the shareholders' value of the …rm is higher with Project-A than Project-B. Whether Project-A is preferred to Project-R (restructuring) depends upon the relative values of V and K. The timing of the model is summarized in Figure 1. 
Worker Incentive and Managerial Decision
The above discussion suggests that there is an interaction between worker incentive and the manager's project choice. In particular, we will show that less monitoring is necessary to elicit worker e¤ort with Project-A than Project-B or -R. To see this, let us …rst consider the case where the manager implements Project-A, so that the …rm continues to operate in the next period. Then, if the worker exerts e¤ort (E = e), he can work for the same …rm in the next period. If he shirks he will be dismissed with probability m. Thus the worker incentive compatibility (IC) constraint is given by w e + H + r (1 m)(w + H + r) + mH;
which simpli…es to m e w + r m:
Second, suppose that the manager chooses Project-B or -R. In this case the worker cannot enjoy rents r, whether or not he exerts e¤ort. The IC constraint with Project-B or Project-R is w e + H (1 m)(w + H) + mH;
which can be written as m e w m:
Note that when Project-B or Project-R is implemented, eliciting worker e¤ort requires more intensive monitoring (m > m) than when the manager implements Project-A. Which project does the manager choose? First, note that the manager never chooses Project-R. With Project-R his utility is given by (a w) m, which is lower than the manager's utility with Project-A, (a w) m and that with Project-B, (a w) m+z. The implications of avoiding Project-R will be discussed later.
Let us focus on the choice between Project-A and Project-B. The manager implements
which can also be written as (m m) z or e w e w + r z:
From (5) we can see that Project-A is likely to be chosen when the worker can receive large rents by staying in the …rm. Recall that Project-A generates higher …rm value than Project-B. This indicates that the autonomous manager may choose Project-A in accordance with the shareholders' interest, despite the private bene…ts he can enjoy by Project-B.
The importance of worker in ‡uence is captured by , the di¢ culty of inducing worker e¤ort. The more di¢ cult that worker monitoring is, the more likely it is that (5) holds. If the worker e¤ort required for production can be elicited without any costs to the manager ( = 0) then (5) never holds, and the manager chooses Project-B unless some external incentive is given.
Implicit Control Mechanism
Intuitively what (5) means is that the manager's preference for Project-A comes from the monitoring-saving e¤ect of this project. When the manager implements Project-A the worker does not have to leave the …rm, and he receives r as long as he exerts e¤ort. On the other hand if Project-B or Project-R is chosen the worker loses rents regardless of his e¤ort. Therefore, the return for e¤ort is higher with Project-A than with Project-B or Project-R, and consequently the manager needs to monitor the worker less when he implements Project-A. We call this an implicit control mechanism, through which the short-sighted manager is induced to choose a project that ensures the long-term viability of the …rm.
Also important is that the manager never conducts restructuring that involves downsizing. Project-R makes it harder for him to elicit worker e¤ort while giving him no private bene…ts. However, Project-R would be more valuable for the shareholders than Project-A, when K (the post-restructuring value) is larger than V . In this case the implicit control mechanism illustrated above biases managerial decisions towards the status-quo, and this bias con ‡icts with shareholder value maximization.
Our argument is based upon the simple idea that current worker performance (motivation) is a¤ected by a …rm's future prospects. In our model, if the worker knows that the …rm continues to operate, he is more willing to exert e¤ort to stay in the …rm for the future rents and less worker monitoring is necessary. We adopt this particular modelling approach because of its expositional simplicity and clear economic intuition. In fact, the relationship between the …rm's future prospects and current worker performance can be modeled di¤erently, to obtain qualitatively the same results as ours. For example, productivity enhancing cooperation among workers will be encouraged when the …rm continues to operate or grow. Deferred compensation can be used to provide incentives e¤ectively only when the …rm is able to pay in the future. Therefore, the scope for the implicit control mechanism we propose may well be much wider than the simple setting presented above.
Implications
Managers May Do Well without Governance
According to the standard view, external governance mechanisms -such as the board of directors, executive equity-based compensation, takeovers, monitoring by large shareholders, or debt -are essential in ensuring the alignment of interests between managers and shareholders. However, in reality it appears that managers may do well without governance. For example, while governance mechanisms like those described above are said to be very weak in Germany, France, and Japan (and in the US and UK before the1960s), many …rms in those economies do seem to perform fairly e¢ ciently, and their shareholders historically have received high rates of return (Hansmann, 1996; Allen and Gale, 2000) . This seems to be a puzzle unsolved by the standard view.
Our model o¤ers an explanation for this puzzle. We have shown that the implicit control mechanism within the …rm may mitigate managerial moral hazard. In the model, when (5) holds, the manager autonomously chooses the project for the survival of the …rm (Project-A) while giving up his private bene…ts (Project-B). If V > K this project choice yields the highest return for the shareholders (1 )(a w) + V . This all suggests that a self-interested and short-sighted manager pursues the long-term viability of the …rm, even in the absence of shareholder governance.
As long as this implicit control mechanism works well, external governance becomes less important in controlling managers. If this is the case, it even may be bene…cial for the shareholders to allow the …rm to be autonomous because the expected bene…ts of governance would be smaller than the costs of external governance. 11 In this sense, the absence of external controls can be considered to be a consequence of the shareholders' optimal decision, not as a failure of corporate governance. It also should be noted that there only is limited evidence that external governance mechanisms have signi…cantly positive e¤ects on corporate performance (Vives, Holderness, 2003) . This may suggest that corporate managers can be controlled e¤ectively by mechanisms other than external governance, as we have discussed above.
Restructuring Aversion
So far, we have focused on the possibility that autonomous managers may maximize the shareholders'value. However, corporate managers sometimes do appear to make decisions that are not aligned with the interests of shareholders. The most important con ‡ict between management and shareholders seems to arise when the …rm needs restructuring. It is commonly observed that managers tend to avoid restructuring even if it increases shareholders' value. Donaldson (1994) reports that rapid restructuring rarely occurs in large organizations without the threat of external intervention. Jensen (1993) argues that corporations largely have failed to exit and implement downsizing in a timely manner.
Why do managers tend to be reluctant to undertake restructuring and/or layo¤s? Although it seems to be an important issue in corporate governance debates, it is not easy to …nd satisfactory answers in the economics literature. The most commonly proposed answer is that there are institutional obstacles that intervene with management and discourage restructuring, such as trade unions, Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs), or various in ‡uence activities by workers. 12 However, in many countries union membership 11 In order to monitor and discipline managerial decisions, shareholders would have to incur signi…cant costs (the costs for information acquisition, intervention, administration of the board, etc.). 12 For example, United Airlines, which has strong unions and large ESOPs, recently faced tremendous di¢ culty exerting wage cuts and layo¤s even while the company was on the verge of bankruptcy. See has been declining steadily and the power exercised by unions has been said to be much weaker than in the past. Moreover, in most …rms employees own only a tiny fraction of company stocks, even under ESOPs, so that the in ‡uence they can exercise through ESOPs is severely limited. Another possible explanation for managerial reluctance to conduct restructuring is management psychology. In particular, it is sometimes argued that managers tend to have a sense of loyalty towards their subordinates, especially through long-term social relationships, and avoid taking actions that hurt them (Baron and Kreps, 2001 ; Grinblatt and Titman, 2001) . 13 This could well be a valid psychological answer but it certainly is interesting to ask whether there are circumstances in which purely self-interested managers behave as if they are emotionally attached to their workers. 14 Our model is able to o¤er an economic explanation for managerial restructuring aversion. According to the model, the manager tries to avoid restructuring (Project-R) because he recognizes that restructuring reduces the worker's incentives to provide e¤ort. In fact, Donaldson (1994, Ch.5) reports the case where a US steel company Armco (now merged into AK Steel) failed to restructure voluntarily, despite the immediate …nancial crisis in 1984. To confront the problem, Armco's COO Robert Boni proposed a general sell-o¤ of its operating units and tried to convince the CEO Harry Holiday at the annual strategy meeting. Holiday, however, rejected the sell-o¤ plan; he stated: "There will be a morale problem if we do this." This statement seems to …t our model, in that the manager's concern for worker incentives (motivation) can discourage restructuring.
Our model suggests that, when restructuring achieves higher …rm value than the status-quo (K > V ), the implicit control mechanism contradicts the interest of the shareholders, by biasing the manager's project choice away from desirable restructuring. In this case external governance is necessary for the shareholders to enjoy higher …rm value. This seems to be consistent with the empirical evidence, indicating that corporate governance mechanisms (ownership structure, debt, bank monitoring) matter particularly when …rms need restructuring (Denis, Denis and Sarin, 1996; Kang and Shivdasani, 1997; Berger and Ofek, 1999) . Our model also suggests that corporate governance becomes a more serious issue in mature industries or low-growth economies, where the …rm's restructuring value Milgrom (1988) , and Meyer, Milgrom and Roberts (1991), Booth (1995) for employee activities that directly a¤ect managerial decisions. 13 Baron and Kreps (2001) suggest that "If the employer and employee have a long-term social relationship, it can be hard (to say the least) for the employer to be as hard-edged as is sometimes warranted" (p.85). Grinblatt and Titman (2001) state that "Managers generally …nd it unpleasant to layo¤ employees, and similarly, …nd it rewarding to o¤er their employees good career opportunities" (p. 607). 14 Another possible (somewhat tautological) explanation for managers'reluctance to conduct restructuring would be that a manager's utility depends positively on …rm size (Baumol, 1959; Marris, 1964) .
K is more likely to be higher than its status-quo value V .
Corporate Survival
It has been pointed out that corporate managers tend to pursue corporate survival itself, rather than shareholder value maximization (Radner, 1996) . Based on extensive interviews of US CEOs, Donaldson and Lorsch (1983, p. 7) observed that "corporate executives are primarily concerned with long-term corporate survival". This may look puzzling from an economic point of view since a manager's interest in the …rm should be limited to his tenure. From their interview research Donaldson and Lorsch (1983) attributed the survival motive to management psychology: managers are attached to the corporation in which they have invested so much of themselves, psychologically and professionally.
In contrast, our model enables us to understand managers'inclination for corporate survival from an economics perspective. Although we assume that the manager's interest is limited only to his tenure (current) period, he may implicitly be induced to seek the long-term viability of the …rm because choosing Project-A for survival makes it easier to elicit worker e¤ort.
From his interviews with the CEO's of leading companies around the world, Garten (2001, p.170) asserts that "creating value today rests on establishing strong links with a wide range of constituencies, which requires taking a long-term view". Garten's claim seems to support our story: although a self-interested manager has a limited horizon, he may have a long-term view spurred by his need to motivate (monitor) workers.
Risk Aversion
Our model also can be extended to explain managerial risk aversion (Stulz, 1984; Smith and Stulz, 1985; Tufano; . In particular, we are able to show that even risk-neutral managers may try to avoid risky projects because the possibility of bankruptcy threatens the worker's job security and makes it more di¢ cult to elicit worker e¤ort.
In addition to the framework developed in Section 2, consider Project-C. The manager's private bene…t with this project is assumed to be 0, as with Project-A. However, with Project-C there is a probability (> 0) that the …rm goes bankrupt and the next period …rm value becomes 0. However, if the …rm survives Project-C generates the …rm value V C in the next period.
The worker's IC constraint with Project-C is given by
(1 )(w e + H + r) + (w e + H)
From (6) we obtain the manager's monitoring intensity e w + (1 )r m C which is higher than that with Project-A (m). Therefore the manager will never choose Project-C because it gives rise to higher monitoring costs associated with bankruptcy risk. If (1 )V C > V , the autonomous management fails to choose the project that maximizes the shareholders'value.
This suggests that managerial risk aversion may be attributed not only to the managers' own risk preference, but also to the e¤ect of their decisions on worker motivation. When risky projects generate higher …rm value, autonomous managers under the implicit control mechanism will diminish the shareholders'value.
International Di¤erences in Corporate Governance
In contrast to the standard economics literature on corporate governance, our model explicitly incorporates a role of worker-related factors in managerial control. As we have seen, (5) implies that when the worker receives higher rents r, Project-A is more likely to be chosen. On the other hand in the absence of such rents (r = 0), the worker is indi¤erent between staying and leaving and the manager chooses Project-B for any z > 0.
One of the important sources of such rents is a joint surplus due to labour market frictions. When search and hiring costs are high, workers staying in the same …rm are likely to be better o¤ than those who move from one …rm to another. In other words, in countries with less ‡exible labour markets or a higher degree of long-term employment, such as Germany, France, and Japan, workers may receive higher rents by staying in the same …rm. Therefore, in these countries the implicit control mechanism we propose may be more e¤ective than in the US, and under certain conditions substitute for external governance mechanisms. 15 This might explain why shareholder intervention and governance appear to have been relatively weak in Germany, France, and Japan compared to in the US.
16 15 According to OECD's (1993) report, Germany, France, and Japan have a higher degree of long-term employment (measured by tenure and retention rates) than the US. 16 One may argue that, especially in Japan and Germany, banks and interlocking shareholdings have played signi…cant roles in corporate governance (Sheard, 1989; Berglof and Perotti, 1994; Aoki and Patrick, 1994; Osano, 1996) . However, empirical evidence on their e¤ect on corporate performance is mixed: some have found signi…cant positive e¤ects on corporate performance (Cable, 1985; Kaplan and Minton, 1994; Kang and Shivdasani, 1995) , whereas others have found insigni…cant or negative e¤ects (Edwards and Fisher, 1994; Weinstein and Yafeh, 1998 ; Hanazaki and Horiuchi, 2000).
Conclusion
This paper has explored the possibility that managers may be disciplined internally, even in the absence of external governance. We have proposed an implicit control mechanism, whereby a self-interested, short-sighted manager may nevertheless take into account the long-term consequences of his decisions through his need to motivate workers. However, we have also argued that, when the …rm requires restructuring, this implicit control mechanism will contradict the interests of the shareholders. We also o¤er possible insights into international di¤erences in corporate governance. Since the implicit mechanism is more likely to be e¤ective when workers have a larger stake in the current …rms for which they are working, the need for external governance may vary according to labour market frictions and other labour-related variables in each country. Our argument is based upon the simple idea that there is an important link between the …rm's future prospects and current worker performance. We have focused on worker monitoring to represent the link, but this is not the only modelling approach to obtain similar insights as ours. Instead of worker monitoring, we could introduce other features such as cooperation among workers or deferred compensation, which would be facilitated when the …rm continues to operate and perform well in the future. This indicates that the scope for the implicit control mechanism we have proposed may well be much wider than the simple setting presented in this paper.
